We read two papers on Inequity Aversion by E. Fehr & K. Schmidt. We examine the structure and quality of their arguments and the use they make of rhetoric in their papers.
Introduction
The idea of Inequity Aversion, introduced by E. Fehr and K. Schmidt in a QJE paper, has from its inception, struck a chord in the heart of Economics. It has been particularly attractive to Experimental Economists to whom it was presumably directed. Two years after the …rst paper introducing the idea was written, a year after its publication, the authors have been invited to present a survey of their and related theories in the distinguished 8th World Congress of the Econometric Society. The two papers have soon become very popular, many experimentalists applying the new concept and many (well over 500; according to Scholar.Google) citing these papers. The attraction of the theory is, no doubt, due to its simplicity and its ease of use, but partly also due to Fehr and Schmidt's claim of having tested and con…rmed the theory using extensive experimental data.
For my shame, I have not read this literature until recently. When I …nally came to read the two papers, I was introduced to a subculture hitherto unknown to me, a subculture that apparently coexists parallel to main-line economics and in which di¤erent rules of logic and di¤erent laws of proof apply.
In this sphere it seems to be permitted to misquote one's own theorems, to place crucial information in appendices and footnotes, to treat data in a casual and nonchalant way, and it is allowed to in ‡ate results when citing them in subsequent papers.
All these transgressions can be found in the two papers by Fehr and Schmidt who at the same time praise the sophisticated scienti…c standards of Experimental Economics.
After introducing the idea of Inequity Aversion in their QJE paper, Fehr & Schmidt present two important results whose aim is to test and con…rm their theory.
The …rst result in the QJE paper is an important test of their theory. Fehr and Schmidt calibrate their model using the data from Ultimatum Games. Using this calibration they explain the experimental observations in four other games.
The second con…rmation of the theory is their claim that the theory of inequity aversion has no quarrel with V. Smith's established and robust experimental observations of Competitive Markets. Smith and others have shown that experimental markets converge to the competitive equilibrium. Fehr and Schmidt aim to show that the fairness they add to the players'preferences does not contradict these results. They claim that even in populations with high degree of inequity aversion the equilibrium is the competitive one (or close to it).
I will demonstrate that Fehr & Schmidt have failed to show these results. I will argue that by obscuring fundamental methodological questions, by treating data in a casual way, by misquoting their own theorems and by in ‡ating their own results, they have wrapped their statements and arguments with so much confusion and fog that it is easy for the reader to believe that Fehr and Schmidt established their important results, when, in fact, they have not. I will show that Fehr & Schmidt continue to exaggerate the extent of these results when citing them in recent papers (2003) (2004) .
It is not for me to say why Fehr and Schmidt resorted to such techniques, but whatever the reason may be, the e¤ect of these rhetorical devices is to augment and boost the papers'message.
These are grave charges that ought to be, and will be, meticulously substantiated in this pamphlet. For this purpose I will quote extensively from the two papers. The …rst paper (QJE) introduces the theory of inequity aversion and contains the main results and computations. The second, the invited paper was written a year later and is a review of the related literature, as such, it juxtaposes the theory of Inequity Aversion with other related theories. This has allowed the authors to re ‡ect upon their concepts and clarify their views. There are no new results concerning Inequity Aversion in the Invited Paper, but the aims and the results of the QJE paper are more clearly expressed in it.
It is NOT my aim to argue with the theory of Inequity Aversion in this pamphlet. I do not intend to examine its general methodology or how useful the theory may be, neither con…rm it, nor prove it false. My aim is to examine the rhetorical devices used by the authors, to look at the structure and quality of their arguments, their logic, their choice of words and the way they use them, and to examine how the description of their results evolves over time. In a way, this pamphlet is a literary study of their papers, which, given the subject matter, assumes some knowledge of technical and economic concepts.
The two papers of Fehr and Schmidt are: 1. Fehr, Ernst and Klaus M. Schmidt, 1999 . "A Theory of Fairness, Competition and Co-operation."Quarterly Journal of Economics, 114, 817-868.
The Theory of Inequity Aversion
The starting point of the papers is the empirical and experimental evidence accumulated over the last decades, indicating that in many one-shot games people do not behave according to the traditional theory that assumes individuals to be concerned only with their own material payo¤s. There is experimental evidence that in some (one-shot) situations individuals behave sel…shly and in others they are willing to reward or punish others at a cost to themselves. Fehr & Schmidt propose to change the basic assumption of sel…shness by introducing a utility function which will permit equity to enter the individuals'preferences. They suggest a utility function that depends on the material payo¤s of ALL individuals -the distribution of payo¤s in the population. This is the only deviation from the traditional theory. F&S continue to assume that, given their utility functions, the players are fully rational. Fehr & Schmidt's aim is to …nd a simple model that will explain this seemingly contradictory altruistic, spiteful and sel…sh behavior.
Before introducing their theory, F&S embark on a short debate with doubting Economists. "Why are economists so reluctant to give up the self-interest hypothesis?" they ask, and provide two answers. The …rst is that self-interest proved very successful in predicting behavior in some situations, the second is a methodological objection to change the basic assumption since anything can be explained by choosing the 'right'preferences. F&S'response to the last objection is that it made sense in the past, but now that experimental economics has developed 'sophisticated tools to examine the nature of preferences in a scientifically rigorous way', this is no longer true (INV p.209) . The existence of these tools is meant to remove all doubts from the remaining sceptics about using the proposed utility function of F&S. In the following pages we will carefully read F&S'papers and we will get a taste of these sophisticated and rigorous scienti…c tools.
The Inequity Aversion Utility function F&S propose the following utility function as representing their Inequity Aversion for a population of n individuals:
where
For 2 individuals, this becomes:
The parameter measures the envy of being poorer than another individual while the parameter measures the discomfort of being better o¤. The utility function is normalized by the factor n 1; where n is the size of the population. The utility function allows an individual to behave altruistically or spitefully depending on the distribution of payo¤s.
Prediction Across Games
In section V of QJE (Prediction Across Games) the authors "examine whether the distribution of parameters that is consistent with experimental observations in the ultimatum game is consistent with the experimental evidence from the other games." (QJE p.843) In fact, they do more: they derive a distribution of ; 0 s from the experimental data on Ultimatum Games and use it to explain the experimental data of 4 other games: Ultimatum Games with Proposer and Responder Competition and Public Good Games With and Without Punishments.
F&S do not tell us anything about the methodology of this computation. In the above quotation they talk about 'THE distribution of parameters that is consistent with the experimental observation in the ultimatum game'. What do they intend to do if they …nd many such distributions and not all of them consistent with the evidence from the games they wish to explain? Will they be content to …nd a single distribution that explains the other games? How will they go about choosing this distribution? Do they have a method to choose such a distribution, a method that will avoid the obvious pitfalls of being in ‡uenced by the data of the games they wish to explain? If, indeed, it is their aim to …nd a single distribution, why give Ultimatum Games a special status? Simply write down a distribution and show that it explains all games, including the UG.
These are such obvious questions to ask, that it is hard to believe that F&S have not considered them. But they do not mention these questions in their papers, and if they do have any answers they do not share them with the reader.
Before we actually look at their computation, it is instructive to see how they describe this computation in their QJE paper and a year later in INV (the emphases are mine).
In QJE: "The objective is rather to o¤ er a …rst test for whether there is a chance that our theory is consistent with the quantitative evidence from di¤ erent games. Admittedly, this test is rather crude." (QJE, p.843 top), and again: "Clearly, the above computations provide only rough evidence in favor of our model." (QJE p. 846) The descriptions 'crude','rough' and '…rst test' (in QJE) are replaced by 'accurate'(in INV), the mere 'computation' is upgraded to a 'calibration', and 'di¤ erent games' becomes 'many games'.
It must be, that during the year before writing the second paper, F&S have critically reassessed their scienti…c standards and found them exacting and far too demanding. They realized that they have been too severe to themselves and that the calculation they erroneously called crude, is in fact accurate. In addition, they re-read the extensive literature on calibration (the term calibration does not even appear in QJE) and decided that what they called a computation deserves the title calibration.
F&S did not tell us why they thought the computations were crude, nor do they tell us what made them change their mind. Although it would have been appropriate, indeed essential, to inform us why they think that the computations should no longer be considered crude.
It is unfair to criticize a crude and rough calculation which is meant to be only a …rst test, but now that F&S see this calculation as a calibration which yields accurate predictions, we may be justi…ed in applying stringent measures to test their claims. A careful study of their computation will show that their …rst description of it is by far the more suitable one.
The Impossibility of a Fine Calibration.
Recall that the distribution of the parameters in the Inequity Aversion model is a joint distribution of 0 s and 0 s. Each individual in the population has both and : This joint distribution cannot be deduced from the data on Ultimatum games. In the ultimatum game a responder reacting to a given o¤er will practice either his envy ( ) or his discomfort at being better o¤ ( ) but never both simultaneously. According to the theory, a proposer will never o¤er more than 1=2 of the surplus and so he practices only his : Unless we are informed how the same individual played in both roles, the most one can …nd using the data are the separate derived distributions of and : The data F&S present is not detailed at the individual level, so a joint distribution cannot be deduced from this data.
But even the derived distributions of ; cannot be …nely tuned. When inequity aversion theory is applied to the UG it predicts only coarse intervals for the values of : This can be easily con…rmed by a quick look at equation 5 of proposition 1 (QJE p. 827) 2 : For example, all that the theory tells us about those proposers who made an o¤er of 0:5 is that their is 0:5: It is therefore impossible to fully calibrate the inequity aversion model with the UG data. Unfortunately, F&S need the joint distribution for explaining the behavior in the public good game with punishment, and the exact values of prove to be crucial for explaining other games. F&S do not address these di¢ culties. We shall see later what F&S do when they are forced to face these problems.
The Data on Ultimatum Games and the Calibration.
The data on Ultimatum Games that F&S use for the calibration is to be found in Table I of QJE and in Roth [1995] . Table I ( QJE p.827) 3 lists the o¤ers made by the proposers in ultimatum games. Proposers do not o¤er more than 1=2 of the surplus, so this information may be used to …nd the distribution of their 0 s (the discomfort of being richer). A responder faced with an o¤er of less than 1 2 of the surplus, uses his to accept or reject the o¤er. Thus, to …nd the distribution of 0 s one needs to have detailed information on o¤er rejection rates by responders. This information is not in Table I , it is presumably to be found in Roth [1995] : The 1995 paper by Roth is a 95 (!) page long article in the Handbook of Experimental Economics. F&S do not tell us where exactly in these 95 pages the data can be found. The article has some scattered data on rejection rates in one or two experiments, but I could not …nd the data in the format F&S use. Transparency does not seem to be part of the rigor that scienti…c methods require. Could it be that F&S distilled the data from the 16 diagrams on pages 285-287 of Roth [1995] , or perhaps from Figure 4 :6 on p.278? Could it be that all the data they allude to refers only to the UG experiments of Roth et al. [1991] , i.e. a mere 13% of the observations in Table I ? In fact, it matters very little what exactly the data is, since all we are told about it is included in the following 3 sentences, and the wording of these sentences makes it clear that the choice of the parameters is very casual:
"Thus, we (conservatively) assume that 10% of the subjects have = 4 " and "Another, typically much larger fraction of the population insists on getting at least one-third of the surplus, which implies a value of which is equal to one. These are at least 30 percent of the population." and "Another, say, 30 percent of the subjects insist on getting at least one quarter, which implies = 0:5" (QJE pp. 843 844).
Clearly, the data does not pin down the distribution. There are many degrees of freedom left, there are many distributions that will …t this data. The theory assumes that proposers are familiar with the distribution of inequity aversion among the responders ( ). It postulates that they make their o¤ers given their own inequity aversion ( ) and that they optimize against the responders distribution. Thus, the intervals of 0 s that F&S suggest in equation 14 (QJE p.844) are a function of the coarsely chosen distribution, these intervals are therefore subject to large variations.
To complete the distribution of the parameter ; F&S provide this information:
"If we look at the actual o¤ ers made in the ultimatum game, there are roughly 40 percent of the subjects who suggest an equal split. Another 30 percent o¤ er s 2 [0:4; 0:5), while 30 percent o¤ er less than 0:4. There are hardly any o¤ ers below 0:25. " (QJE 844)
This information is not available in Table I , and F&S do not inform us where they got this data from. Table I Table III 4 (QJE p.844).
F&S use this calibration to explain the experimental behavior in 4 di¤er-ent games: A market game with proposers competition, a market game with responders competition , a public good game without punishment and a public good game with punishment Let us now see how F&S explain these experiments.
3.3 Explaining the Market Game with Proposers' Competition.
The …rst experiment to be explained is a market game with proposers' competition, by Roth, Prasnikar, Okuno Fujiwara and Zamir [1991] . The game is an ultimatum game with added competition among the proposers and a crucial restriction of the single responder's actions. In this game a number of proposers simultaneously make o¤ers to a single responder who is restricted to accept or reject the highest o¤er. If he accepts the o¤er, one of the proposers of that o¤er is chosen at random and they split the surplus, while all others get 0 payo¤ (QJE p.829). In the experiment by Roth et al. the outcome converged to the competitive equilibrium (in which the single responder gets all the surplus). F&S prove in Proposition 2 (QJE p.830) that for any degree of inequity aversion of the players, the only equilibrium of the game is the competitive one in which the responder receives the total surplus. There is no need to restrict the distribution of inequity aversion parameters to the proposed calibration, any distribution of parameters and preferences yields the competitive outcome 5 . In section 4 we discuss the relevance of this particular game to what F&S wish to show.
3.4 Explaining the Market Game with Responders'Competition.
The situation is slightly di¤erent in the market game with responders'competition by Güth, Marchand, and Rulliere [1997] : Here, a single proposer makes an o¤er to a group of responders who simultaneously accept or reject it. Among those who accepted the o¤er one responder is chosen at random and the pair splits the surplus while all others receive 0 payo¤. In a competitive outcome all the surplus is given to the single proposer. The experiment was conducted in groups of 6; a single proposer and 5 responders. F&S report that in the experiment conducted by Güth et al., about 80% of the responders accepted an o¤er of less than 0:02 of the surplus, i.e. the outcome was close to the competitive one (QJE p.832). F&S prove in Proposition 3 (QJE p.832) that in order to obtain an outcome close to the competitive equilibrium two individuals need to be su¢ ciently selfish: the proposer AND the least inequity averse responder. The proposer's inequity aversion parameter should satisfy < n 1 n ; where n is the size of the population.
When they come to describe this result, F&S ignore the condition on the proposer's sel…shness, they misquote the proposition, and claim that a single player (a responder) can induce a competitive outcome (QJE p.819). This exclusion proves to be signi…cant for their calculation. (See section 4 for a more detailed description of their treatment of this experiment).
Following that part of the proposition which they do not ignore: a single sel…sh responder can enforce a competitive outcome. F&S calculate the probability that at least one sel…sh responder (with = 0) is present in a group of 5 responders. According to the calibration this is 1 0:7 5 = 83% (QJE p.845), a …gure which is roughly compatible with the 80% groups in the experiment who played very close to the competitive equilibrium.
The additional, totally ignored, condition for the sel…shness of the proposer is < n 1 n = 5 6 = 0:8 3: Miraculously, the highest value F&S chose in their distribution is 0:6 < 0:8 3; (recall that any value 1 2 could have been chosen). That is, ALL proposers are made to be su¢ ciently sel…sh. F&S do not even mention in their calculations that it is their choice of the value 0:6 that validates their calculation. The signi…cance of the choice of 0:6 is completely hidden from the reader.
However, choosing the highest as 0:84 (rather than 0:6) yields a probability of (1 0:4) 1 0:7 5 = 0:499 16 for the outcome to be competitive, i.e. 50%: This is considerably less compatible with 80%: The casual choice of values for the proposed distribution proved to be very successful.
In fact, this miracle should be more stringently interpreted. The calibration of the inequity aversion model using the UG data fails to explain the experiment 
Explaining Public Good Games
F&S analyze two types of Public Good Games: with and without punishments. A public good game with no punishment is a one stage game in which all players have income y. Each player may give up an amount g of his income which becomes a quantity ag (a < 1) of a public good enjoyed by all. E¢ ciency requires that all players contribute their entire income y; but the equilibrium of the traditional model with sel…sh preferences has all players contribute g = 0: In experiments, about 73% of the players made no contributions (QJE p.837).
The second game is a public good game with punishment, it was introduced in an experiment by Fehr and Gächter [2000] (in QJE this experiment is referred to as Fehr and Gächter [1996] , but it was published in the meantime). The game has two stages and in the …rst stage it is like the public good game with no punishment in which players may contribute to a public good. In the second stage players may punish others at a cost to themselves. The important experimental observation is that about 80% of the players contribute their entire income (QJE p.838): Thus, the threat of punishment induces e¢ ciency.
In explaining the two games the Inequity Aversion theory faces the challenge of simultaneously explaining free riding in one set-up and cooperation in another.
Explaining Public Good Games without Punishment
The analysis of this game shows that certain individuals will never contribute to the public good and that the others may contribute if their number is su¢ ciently large. The details are in Proposition 4 (QJE p.839) 6 . The proposition states that:
(a) A su¢ ciently sel…sh individual will never contribute, here su¢ ciently sel…sh means having a low (< 1 a) -the parameter of discomfort at being better o¤.
(b) Furthermore, if the number k of such sel…sh individuals is large: k > a (n 1) =2; where n is the group size, then the only equilibrium is one in which no one contributes, g = 0:
(c) If k satis…es a certain condition then there are equilibria in which all the su¢ ciently sel…sh individuals contribute 0 while all others contribute the same amount g 2 [0; y]. The condition on k implies k < a (n 1) =2:
Note that the proposition does not specify what happens when the condition on k is an equality k = a (n 1) =2: The condition k < a (n 1) =2 is therefore NOT a necessary condition for equilibria with positive contributions. Yet F&S claim that it is:
'We know by Proposition 4 that cooperation can be sustained as an equilibrium outcome only if the number k of players..... obeys
This statement is false since for the case k = a (n 1) =2 (for some ; 0 s) there exists an equilibrium with contributions, as well as an equilibrium with no contributions 7 . This false statement is used by F&S in the analysis of the data.
To explain the data of this game, F&S consider the case k = 1; a single su¢ ciently sel…sh individual. According to proposition 4(b), if a (n 1) =2 < k = 1; a single person with a su¢ ciently low su¢ ces to enforce an equilibrium in which no one contributes. If the probability that such an individual is present in each group is high, and all players know it, then they will all contribute g = 0 (this probability can be calculated by using the calibrated distribution of 0 s): But following their false interpretation of the condition, F&S claim that the condition that a single su¢ ciently sel…sh individual can cause all others to free ride is with weak inequality k = 1 a (n 1) =2; this seemingly minor mistake is crucial for the analysis of the data.
The data on the experiments of Public Good Games with no Punishment is presented in Table II treatments' with n = 4; a = 0:5: For these experiments, with altogether 304 subjects, they calculate that the calibrated theory predicts about 97:44% of free riding. We are not being informed that for the rest of the experiments in Table II , with altogether 404 subjects, the calibrated theory predicts 100% of free riding. However, Table II reports that only 73% of the subjects do not contribute. This is a gap of over 33% = 97:44 73 73 of the observations. How do F&S account for this discrepancy? They refer to it in footnote 21 (QJE p.845). F&S inform us that in the …nal round of the game there is a signi…cant fraction of subjects who contribute very little, those should be added to the 73%. Although this is the second time that F&S refer to this non-negligible fraction of subjects (see QJE p.837), they do not provide the data. F&S do not tell us why this data was not included in Table II -the sole  purpose of Table II is to provide the data for explaining the behavior in public good games, if without this detailed data the experiment cannot be explained, why isn't the data there 9 ? To be fair to F&S, partial information (relating only to the Fehr & Gächter [2000] experiment) can be found in the original …gure of Fehr & Gächter reproduced on p.839 of QJE 10 . With the help of a magnifying glass one can attempt to …sh the missing information from the gray puddles of the …gure (these refer to the treatment without punishments): My imprecise estimate is that even if one takes all the contributions up to 40% of the endowment, the percentage of free riding is well below 70%:
It seems that this additional data does not really …ll the gap, because F&S tell us (in the footnote) that they leave it for future research to explain this 33% of noise with the help of theories of fundamental randomness of human choice. In the meantime they conclude (in the text) that "it seems fair to say that our model is consistent with the bulk of individual choices in this game" (QJE p.845).
In all fairness, it seems right to say that until they provide data that substantially closes the gap, or until they do this promised research on fundamental randomness of human behavior (predicting 33% noise), it cannot be said that their model explains the data of this experiment. It is also fair to say that once a theory that predicts so much noise is formulated, few things will be left unexplained.
Explaining Public Good Games with Punishment
F&S profess that from the perspective of their theory this experiment is the most interesting one (QJE p.845), so it must be very important for them to explain it. F&S Prove in Proposition 5 (QJE p.841), that if there is a group of "conditionally cooperative enforcers", players with su¢ ciently high 0 s and 0 s; while all the other players are completely sel…sh ( = = 0) ; then there exist equilibria in which all players contribute the same amount g 2 [0; y] in the …rst stage of the game. To choose among these equilibria F&S apply a 'reasonable re…nement argument', they claim that the e¢ cient equilibrium with g = y is a 'natural focal point' (QJE p.842).
The calculations, which according to F&S are somewhat cumbersome, are put in an appendix. It is in the appendix (QJE p.864) that we …rst hear of the need to know the correlation of and in order to explain this game. It is the 9 E. Fehr, in two papers with other authors, refers to Table II in QJE as a meta-study of public good games with no punishment. He attributes to this study more information than can be found in QJE (contributions in earlier stages of the game). He also mentions that in the last stage 'many'(no …gure is given) players contributed close to zero. See E. …rst time that the term 'correlation' appears in QJE in conjunction with the distribution of ;and :
In the appendix we are told that F&S "mentioned already that the empirical evidence suggests that these parameters are positively correlated" (QJE p.864). I could not …nd any sentence in which the correlation of the parameters was mentioned, nor could I …nd any other experiment from which F&S could derive this correlation. Perhaps they mean the following sentence: "Fehr and Gächter report that the vast majority of punishments is imposed by cooperators on the defectors and that lower contribution levels are associated with higher received punishments." (QJE p.839). This sentence informs us about some empirical …ndings, not about a correlation of parameters in a theory. Leaping from the empirical evidence to a property of parameters in a theory is known as calibration. F&S use this observation and assume a perfect correlation between the parameters. They ignore the fact that by using the joint distribution of ; which was derived from the data of the Fehr-Gächter experiment they are prohibited from explaining this experiment.
But there is another morsel of calibration hidden in the calculations. Here, as in the market experiment with responders' competition, the casual choice of the maximal value of as 0:6 proves to be very crucial. The UG data allowed any value 1 2 : To explain the Fehr-Gächter experiment, Proposition 5 (QJE p. 841) requires the existence of "conditionally cooperative enforcers" with 1 a = 0:6; in the Fehr-Gächter experiment a = 0:4: If the maximal value of is taken to be less than 0:6, the theory totally fails to explain this experiment. Yet again, the choice of a particular value as 0:6 and not, say, 0:59 means that F&S have used this experiment to calibrate their model. and it can no longer be explained by it.
There are other questions that the 'explanation' of this game leaves open. Although these questions are, strictly speaking, super ‡uous in view of the above arguments, I'll brie ‡y mention them for completeness sake.
F&S claim that g = y is "a natural focal point" because it is e¢ cient. Is it more natural than g = 0 or indeed g = y=2 ? These are also symmetric focal points, albeit ine¢ cient ones. F&S do not support their choice of a particular focal point by any experimental evidence. I believe there is a debate in the experimental community concerning e¢ ciency and inequity aversion and that it has not been settled yet.
F&S quote and apply Proposition 5 incorrectly: "For example, if all four players believe that there is at least one player with i 1:5 and i 0:6, there is an equilibrium in which all four players contribute the maximum amount." ( QJE p.846). Proposition 5 postulates that the members of a group are either 'conditionally cooperative enforcers'or completely sel…sh ( = = 0) : The condition that the other players are completely sel…sh as required by the proposition seems to be completely missing from the calculations.
Dictator Games and Gift Exchange Games
These two games seem to be in a category and a section (Section VI, QJE p.847) of their own. F&S provide intuition why the theory of inequity aversion can explain the behavior in experiments of these games, but they do not attempt to explain these games using the calibration. For dictator games F&S reason that they can be better explained by a non linear version of their model.
A summary of the Calibration
The data of the ultimatum game cannot be used to …nd the joint distribution of ; : For the separate distributions of ; ; the theory (when applied to the UG) yields very crudely de…ned intervals of the parameters.
The calibration failed to explain the Market Game with Responders'competition and the Public Good Game with Punishment. F&S have used the data of these experiments to further calibrate their model. [0:6 < 0:8 3; the correlation between ; ]:
The calibration failed to explain the Public Good Games without Punishment. The discrepancy between the observation and the theory's prediction is well over 30%:
The calibration was not used to explain Gift Exchange Games.
All in all, the only game that F&S have succeeded in explaining is the Market Game with Proposers'Competition (Roth et al. [1991] ) in which the responder is restricted to act sel…shly. For this game the calibration is super ‡uous -all distributions explain it.
Thus, the calibration that F&S present in Table III (QJE p. 844) with the additional correlation between the parameters was obtained from the data of the Ultimatum games, the Market Game with Responders'competition and the Public Good Game with Punishment. Given this (coarse) calibration, F&S may now begin to test their theory.
Competition and Fairness
In this section (section D, QJE p.834) F&S want to demonstrate that the theory of Inequity Aversion agrees with a large body of market experiments which shows that in competitive situations the competitive equilibrium prevails. F&S want to show that in competitive situations the equilibrium is close to the competitive one even if the population is highly inequity averse.
In their own words: F&S start from the ".. well established experimental fact that in a broad class of market games prices converge to the competitive equilibrium. [Smith 1982, Davis and Holt 1993] ." (QJE p.829), they want to demonstrate that "convergence to standard competitive predictions can occur even if agents are very strongly concerned about fairness" (INV p.212).
F&S show it by analyzing two examples of market games and they derive a general principle from these examples. The two games were discussed earlier, one by Roth, Prasnikar, Okuno Fujiwara and Zamir [1991] and the other by Güth, Marchand, and Rulliere [1997] . F&S prove propositions (proposition 2 , 3 QJE pages 830; 832) which describe conditions under which these games have a competitive equilibrium. The two propositions "suggest that there is a more general principle at work" (QJE p.834) and this general principle is: "that no single player can enforce an equitable outcome" (QJE p.834).
How general can this principle be if derived from two particular examples? How were these examples chosen? In a footnote we are told that the two experiments in this section were chosen for their simplicity and tractability (footnote 9. QJE p. 829). Do these examples possess any other properties except for their simplicity?
We argue that the …rst game is logically unsuitable to demonstrate their point and that the second game does not show it.
Consider how F&S prove their points. The …rst example by Roth et al. is the market game with proposers competition described in section 3.3 above. In this game the responder is restricted to consider only the highest o¤er. This prevents him from practicing any inequity aversion he may have. Consider a responder who received two o¤ers, one which gives him the whole cake and the other half of it. The responder is restricted to choose between accepting the o¤er 1 and rejecting it and having 0; he is not allowed to consider the o¤er 0:5: Thus he is prevented from choosing the equitable point, which he may actually prefer. Recall that F&S'aim is to show that the competitive result prevails however high the inequity aversion in the population may be. This game does not allow inequity aversion to be arbitrarily high, one speci…c player is not allowed to have or practice any inequity aversion. The model they chose is simply not suitable for what they wish to demonstrate.
In fact, if we remove this restriction and allow the responder to accept any o¤er (or to reject all o¤ers), and if we endow him with high inequity aversion, > n 1 n ; then the only equilibrium is the equitable partition in which all the proposers o¤er 1 2 and the responder accepts it. Thus the responder can force an equitable outcome irrespective of how sel…sh the other players are. F&S do not consider this possibility. This shows, contrary to what F&S claim, that fairness considerations do matter even in competitive situations and that their theory (as it is presented in these papers) is not compatible with the experimental observations on competitive markets.
The situation is even more delicate in their second example, the market game with responders'competition, by Güth, Marchand, and Rulliere [1997] discussed in section 3.4 above. In this game a single proposer makes an o¤er to a number of responders. In Proposition 3 (QJE p.832) F&S show that to obtain an outcome which is close to the competitive equilibrium the proposer and at least one of the responders need to be su¢ ciently sel…sh . If the proposer's discomfort at being better o¤ ( ) is not too high, < n 1 n ; and if one of the responders is willing to accept a low share of the surplus then all other responders are forced to accept this share in equilibrium. Thus, how close the equilibrium is to the competitive outcome depends on the most sel…sh responder and the proposer's sel…shness.
Like in the previous market game by Roth et al., if the single proposer is su¢ ciently inequity averse > n 1 n the only equilibrium is one in which he proposes 1 2 and all accept it. Again, contrary to F&S'general principle, a single player can enforce an equitable outcome.
F&S observe that, as the number of responders (n 1) increases, the proposer is less likely to be su¢ ciently inequity averse (i.e. with > n 1 n ): Thus as n increases and the inequality is reversed: < n 1 n ; the responder prefers the allocation (1; 0; 0; :::; 0) to 1 2 ; 1 2 ; 0; :::; 0 : This property is a direct consequence of the normalization of the utility function (dividing by n 1): The normalization assumption was introduced with no attempt to justify it (QJE p.824); and there seems to be no compelling reason why this consequence should be true. Is it really reasonable that an individual is less likely to contribute to a charity, helping the victims of a natural disaster, just because the number of victims increased? Indeed, tsunamis do not often occur in laboratories but this does not make this consequence more palatable, nor are the populations in the laboratory particularly large to guarantee that any will be smaller than n 1 n .
When they describe their result, F&S misquote the proposition and ignore its …ne details:
"under certain competitive conditions a single purely sel…sh player can induce a large number of extremely inequity averse players to behave in a completely sel…sh manner, too." (QJE p. 819).
The single sel…sh player referred to in this quotation is a responder, the proposer is ignored, the fact that he can force an equitable outcome is disregarded.
F&S can now deduce their general principle: "It is, thus, the impossibility of preventing inequitable outcomes by individual players that renders inequity aversion unimportant in equilibrium." (QJE p. 834).
It seems that F&S'general principle does not even apply to the two examples from which it was supposed to have been deduced. In the …rst game the responder who could bring about the equitable outcome was prevented from doing so, and in the second game the proposer, who can force an equitable outcome, was simply ignored by misquoting Proposition 3:
The importance of this 'general principle'for F&S is in its use as an introduction to the topic of Endogenous Incomplete Contracts (QJE p.834) . F&S modify the market game with proposer competition: they allow the responder to accept any o¤er AND at the same time allow the chosen proposer to withdraw his o¤er and thus destroy the surplus. This double modi…cation may lead to an equitable outcome. F&S claim that this "is caused by the fact that in the modi…ed game a single proposer can enforce an equitable outcome" (QJE p.835). They ignore the natural intermediate modi…cation in which the responder is allowed to consider any o¤er (but the proposer is not allowed to withdraw his o¤er), which may also lead to an equitable outcome. As a foundation of Endogenous Incomplete Contracts this argument seems rather unsound.
What F&S did in this section is to di¤erentiate between individuals according to their role in the game. The single proposer or the single responder, because of their role in the market, are not allowed to be inequity averse, and are assumed to behave sel…shly. F&S do not discuss these point openly, but it is hard to believe that they meant to introduce such di¤erentiation, because it seems to be against the spirit of their theory. If individuals change their behavior (and their preferences) according to the game they play and their role in it, then their behavior is not likely to be explained by a theory which assumes that players have one utility function across games and roles. A theory of social norms will probably do much better. If F&S meant to allow preferences to be dependent on roles, they should have explicitly said so.
It is interesting to see that F&S relinquish all references to the experiment by Güth, Marchand, and Rulliere in INV, they mention only the experiment by Roth et al. As we have seen, the crucial player in Roth et al., the responder, has had his inequity aversion severed and the outcome is the competitive one irrespective of the preferences of the proposers. This way F&S can truthfully (if misleadingly) state that: "For example, in certain competitive environments (see, e.g., the ultimatum game with Proposer competition in Section 5.1) even a population that consists only of very fair types (high and ) cannot prevent very uneven outcomes." (INV p.221).
The careful phrasing ('in certain competitive environments (e.g. Roth et al...) ...') makes one believe that the authors have a number of such examples. While, in fact, Roth et al. is their only (unsuitable) example, and their own proposition 3 has indicated that in a very similar competitive environment this is no longer true, a single player can enforce an equitable outcome.
Epilogue
Given this litany of ‡aws, it was to be expected that F&S would feel the need to provide some explanation of what they have done, if not in these two pa- Fehr and Schmidt (1999) with experimental data on the ultimatum game. Fehr and Schmidt used this distribution to explain the experimental results in many di¤ erent classes of games, so we want to use it for this game as well." "In Fehr and Schmidt (1999), we …rst calibrated the distribution of the parameters i and i by using the existing experimental evidence on ultimatum and dictator games in the literature. Then, we applied the calibrated model to several other classes of games (public good games, market games, gift exchange games etc.) and showed that our calibrated model is consistent with the experimental evidence on these games as well."
No, they did not use the Dictator Game to calibrate their model, nor did they use the calibration to explain gift exchange games. Since they have not even attempted to explain other games in QJE it is not clear what the 'etc.' stands for.
We would like to end on a more positive note: In a recent paper by U. Fischbacher, C. M. Fong and E. On p.25 we are told that:
"..we completely tied our hands with regard to the choice of the parameters for the FS model by using the same preference parameters as in Fehr and Schmidt (1999) which are presented in Table 1 . This is very important because otherwise we could rationalize too many di¤ erent outcomes by choosing the appropriate preference parameters."
The authors (E. Fehr is one of the authors but not K. Schmidt) admit that too much freedom in choosing a model's parameters is not a rigorous scienti…c method. But what is it they tie their hands to? The only information FFF give us about the distribution in Table 1 ; which they borrow from QJE, is that it was assumed by F&S, no other reason or justi…cation for using it is o¤ered in the paper's 27 pages. They wish to tie their hands for scienti…c reasons, but they should also provide a good reason why they chose this element to be bound to.
We will have to wait and see what the future will bring.
Conclusion
It seems that at least in part of the …eld of experimental economics, the scienti…c standards may not be as rigorous as one may desire. It was in the name of the sophisticated and rigorous scienti…c techniques of experimental economics that F&S asked us to accept their inequity aversion utility function (INV p.209 ). Can we trust their judgement? Their own practices cast a dark shadow on the theory of inequity aversion. Is the theory so weak as to require such aggressive marketing techniques?
But the sad point is not only that two distinguished economists allow themselves to write in this style, it is also that they managed to get by, that these papers have caused no outcry or protest in the experimentalist community 13 . Could it be that, with the exception of QJE's proofreader, no one has ever carefully read the details of the paper until now?
Experimental Economics has the great advantage that, in a super…cial level, the details of the experiment are easy to understand and readily enjoyable. Almost anyone, whether a professional or a layman, is an amateur psychologist and a keen observer of human nature. Anyone will therefore have an opinion about the implications of an experiment, how it can be bettered and what the outcome should be. Compare the lulling e¤ect of a typical JET or Econometrica paper, on an audience of non economists, with the enlivening e¤ect that a good experiment can have on a dinner party.
In comparison with the appeal of the narrative part, the scienti…c part of an experimental study is rather dull. The minute analysis of the data, the statistical details, the intricate comparison with the details of other experiments are all necessary and important, but hardly inspiring.
This di¤erence in interest and appeal of the narrative part and that of the analytical parts, is probably larger in experimental economics than in any other economic …eld.
It is therefore very tempting, when reading an experimental paper, to read only the …rst anecdotal part. After all, any good economist can tell from this part what the implications of the results to economic reasoning are and in which direction the research should proceed. There is an understandable tendency to neglect the duller scienti…c details of the paper.
I argue that this a dangerous policy which may adversely distort our decisions, decisions about promotions and appointments of colleagues, of accepting a paper for publication and of accepting a 'tested'theory. I plead for more care.
Appendix
To aid the reader we reproduce here some tables, …gures, equations and a proposition which may help the reader follow the details of the arguments in this pamphlet. 
